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I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial intervention into the reporting of criminal proceedings 
is a relatively recent phenomenon. The last two decades have seen 
an increasing judicial sensitivity to the potential conflict between 
unhampered reportage of those proceedings and the sixth amend­
ment fair trial rights of criminal defendants. In Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale,l the Supreme Court ruled that courts may close pre­
trial proceedings to the press and public when prejudicial publicity 
1. 	 443 u.s. 368 (1979). 
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threatens fair trial rights. Since it was decided, the case's applica­
bility to different circumstances has been widely controverted. This 
comment will examine what Gannett portends and will establish a 
theory of a right of personal access to criminal trials. 
II. HISTORY OF THE ISSUE 
A. Setting the Stage for Gannett 
The bedrock on which modern courts have built the frame­
work of permissible restrictions on the press is Near v. Minnesota. 2 
The Court ruled that liberty of the press demands immunity from 
previous restraints or censorship.3 The Court noted a few excep­
tions to this rule,4 but there was no doubt after Near that there 
was a heavy presumption against the validity· of prior restraints on 
the press. Absent unusual circumstances, the press is free to pub­
lish what it knows. 
If in the course of a criminal trial, however, the press learns of 
and publishes prejudicial information which would not be admissi­
ble as evidence, its 'right to publish what it knows squarely con­
fronts the right of the defendant to a fair trial. In Sheppard v. 
Maxwell ,5 the Court confronted such a case. 6 Overturning 
Sheppard's conviction, the Court made it clear that Near did not 
prevent a trial judge from exercising control over sources of press 
infol'Il)ation. Adverse effects on courtroom atmosphere created by 
the press were held to be directly controllable by the judge, as 
master of the premises. 7 The Court further held that the release of 
information by the police, counsel and witnesses may be prohibited 
by the trial court. 8 The Court declared that trial judges, other offi­
cers of the court and the police must place the interest of justice 
first, leaving the news media to the task of reporting cases as they 
2. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute which pennitted publication of "a malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" to be enjoined 
held unconstitutional). 
3. Id. at 716. 
4. Id. The exceptions included publications that would hinder a war effort, of­
fend decency, or incite acts of violence or overthrow of the government. The Court 
did not intend the list to be exclusive. It indicated that the list typified the genre of 
subject material which might legitimately be subject to prior restraint. Id. 
5. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
6. During the murder trial the press had published clearly inadmissible mate­
rial consisting of leads, infonnation and gossip made available by police officers, 
witnesses and the counsel for both sides. Id. at 359. 
7. Id. at 358. 
8. Id. at 359. 
1980) ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS 725 
unfold in the courtroom-not pieced together from extrajudicial 
statements. 9 
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,IO the Court ad­
dressed the constitutionality of an attempt to restrain the press 
from reporting prejudicial information which it possessed or might 
come to possess, as opposed to restraint on sources of that informa­
tion. The trial court's gag order, 11 issued at the request of both the 
prosecution and the defense, as finally modified by the Nebraska 
Supreme Court,12 forbade the reporting of confessions or admis­
sions made to anyone except members of the press, and any other 
facts strongly implicative of the accused. The Supreme Court held 
that this was a prior restraint on publication and ruled that the 
heavy presumption against its validity imposed by Near had not 
been overcome. First, the Court noted that even pervasive adverse 
pre-trial publicity does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. 13 The 
tone, extent and sources of the information, as well as the court's 
efforts to mitigate its effects, may de'termine whether the defend­
ant receives a trial consistent with the requirements of due proc­
ess. 14 Even when there has been a finding of a substantial likeli­
hood of impairment of fair trial rights by unchecked publicity, the 
Court said that alternative methods of protecting those rights must 
be found to be inadequate before prior restraint is justified. When 
prior restraint appears warranted, it must be shown to be manage­
able, enforceable and capable of reaching and stifling publications 
that could carry the target information into the court's jurisdiction. 
Finally, the court must find that without the restriction, there 
could not be a fair trial. To be valid, the restriction must be nar­
row and precise, reaching only that which would prejudice the de­
fendant's rights and no more. IS 
9. Id. at 362. 
10. 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gag order prohibiting publication of confessions, ad­
missions and other 'facts strongly implicative of defendant is prior restraint, subject to 
heavy presumption against validity which was not overcome by fair trial interests in 
this case). 
11. Defense attorneys tend to call court orders which restrain publication pro­
tective orders. Media counsel call them gag orders. The terms are synonymous. 
12. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd sub nom. 
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Nebraska Supreme Court 
found that prior restraint was justified by the possible effect of pretrial publicity on 
fair trial rights, and modified the trial court's gag order, which had forbidden dissem­
ination of all testimony or evidence adduced in a pretrial hearing, into the form de­
clared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Nebraska Press. Id. 
13. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 554. 
14. Id. at 555. 
15. Id. at 565-69. 
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Before discussing Gannett, a decision triggered by a court's at­
tempt to deal with the limitations on press restraint imposed by 
Nebraska Press, one other strain of Supreme Court cases should be 
examined. Pell v. Procunier,16 Saxbe v. Washington Post CO.17 and 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 18 all dealt with an asserted first amend­
ment right of the press to gain access to prisons for purposes of 
gathering information and reporting on inmates and conditions in 
the rehabilitation system. The Court ruled that the press possesses 
no special right of access to prisons over and above that enjoyed by 
the general public. The Court rejected the idea that the Constitu­
tion imposes upon government an affirmative duty to make availa­
ble to journalists sources of information not available to members 
of the public generally.19 Since the restrictions imposed on the 
general public were validly grounded in legitimate concerns for se­
curity and the integrity of the rehabilitative scheme, the press 
could not complain of being bound by the same strictures. The 
rule synthesized by the Pell, Saxbe and Houchins triumvirate is 
that the press has a right to gather information from any available 
source, but it may not successfully resort to the first amendment to 
compel anyone, including the government, to supply that informa­
tion. 20 Where a right of access to government-controlled sources of 
information has been granted the public, the rights of the press co­
incide, but do not extend further. 
B. The Gannett Decision 
Mter Nebraska Press, many trial courts despaired of ever be­
ing able to formulate a gag order that would pass muster under the 
21stringent standards of that case. Faced with situations in which 
16. 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison inmates and journalists sought to enjoin a state 
prison regulation prohibiting media interviews with specific individual inmates). 
17. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Saxbe presented the same issue as Pell, although 
within the federal prison system. Id. The cases were decided on the same day. 
18. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). A television station was denied permiSSion to send a 
news crew into a prison to report on conditions which may have led to a suicide. 
The station and the NAACP filed suit, alleging a violation of first amendment rights, 
claiming that information on the jail was essential to permit public debate on condi­
tions there. At the time, no public tours of the facility were permitted. 
19. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. at 850. 
20. "The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in govern­
ment. But the press. cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will 
succeed. There is no constitutional right [of the press) to have access to particular 
government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy." Stewart, "Or 
of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975). 
21. Although Chief Justice Burger's Nebraska Press majority opinion allows for 
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they perceived a danger to fair trial rights due to unrestricted re­
portage of criminal proceedings, trial judges began to tum to clo­
sure orders to protect defendants from the effects of prejudicial 
publicity, at least to the extent that the publicity originated in the 
courtroom. "You can't let'em in and then tell'em not to report 
what they see and hear," said Nebraska Press. "But nobody says 
you have to let 'em in," said Pell, Saxbe and Houchins. Or so it 
seemed. By closing the court to all but the participants in a crimi­
nal proceeding, the courts hoped to curtail press reports of those 
events which would arguably prejudice the ability of the fact finder 
to determine the defendant's innocence or guilt according to the 
proper standards of evidence and law. 22 Coupled with the power, 
confirmed in Sheppard, to regulate courtroom atmosphere and 
sources of information within the control of the court, the closed 
courtroom appeared to close a significant chink in the judicially 
tailored armor protecting defendants' fair trial rights. 
In Gannett, the Court upheld a trial court order which closed 
a pre-trial suppression hearing on prejudicial publicity grounds. A 
newspaper claimed a right of access based on the first, sixth and 
fourteenth amendments. 23 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Jus-
the possibility of a constitutional gag order, the concurring opinIOns of Justices 
Brennan (joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall), White and Stevens indicate that a 
majority of the Justices believe that such an order is never permissible. See Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 570 (White, J., 
concurring); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
22. See, e.g., Buffalo Courier-Express v. Stiller, 62 App. Div. 2d 1173 (1978); In 
re Merola, 5 MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 1033 (App. Div. N.Y., 1979). 
23. The hearing was on a motion to suppress incriminating statements and 
other evidence, including a revolver, in connection with a New York prosecution for 
a 1976 murder. Police theorized that the victim, whose body was never found, was 
shot with the revolver, his own gun, while with two defendants on his boat on a 
lake. The two fled with a 16 year old companion in the victim's truck. Police found 
the truck in Michigan, and arrested the trio shortly thereafter. One of them led po­
lice to the gun. Gannett operated a newspaper in the vicinity of the crime which 
duly reported all of this information. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 371-75. 
At the hearing, the defendants claimed that they had made incriminating state­
ments involuntarily and moved to suppress the physical evidence as the fruit of 
those involuntary statements. Defense attorneys argued that the unabated buildup of 
adverse publicity had jeopardized the defendants' ability to obtain a fair trial and 
moved that the press and public be excluded from the hearing. Neither the district 
attorney nor a reporter for the Gannett paper present at the hearing objected. The 
trial judge granted the motion. [d. at 374-75. 
The next day, the reporter wrote to the judge, asserting a right to attend. The 
judge responded the same day, noted that the hearing was over and set a date for a 
hearing on Gannett's motion to set aside the closure order. He refused to vacate the 
order at the hearing, and Gannett started the appeal process, alleging violation of 
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tice Stewart said that the trial judge has an affirmative duty to mini­
mize the effects of prejudicial publicity and may take protective 
steps even if they have not been shown to be strictly necessary.24 If 
one of those protective steps is the closure of the proceeding, the 
press may not successfully raise objections to it based on the sixth 
amendment right to a public trial. That right is personal to the de­
fendant and may not be asserted by anyone else. Justice Stewart 
said that the adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon 
the proposition that the public interest is fully protected by the 
participants in the litigation. 25 This protection is largely a function 
of the duty of prosecutors to be servants of the law, placing justice 
before their interest in obtaining convictions. This duty requires 
sensitivity to the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial, a 
sensitivity also required of trial judges. The public interest in the 
fair administration of justice is thus protected by the judge and the 
prosecutor, who represent the public. The protection is still intact, 
therefore, when the court accedes to a request for a closed court. 26 
It is clear from the context of the opinion, however, that the 
"public interest" of which Justice Stewart speaks is limited to the 
interest in affording the benefits which public trails are presumed 
to provide for the defendant. These are primarily due process guar­
antees, in Justice Stewart's view. The opinion does not address the 
public's interest in open trials beyond questioning whether an in­
dependent public interest in the enforcement of sixth amendment 
guarantees exists, and whether that putative interest alone creates 
a constitutional right on the part of the public to open proceed­
ings.27 
The Court next addressed the history of the open trial, sum­
marily declaring it to show no more than a "common-law rule" of 
open civil and criminal proceedings. 28 The Court said that few 
such rules have been elevated to the status of constitutional 
first, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 375-76. The intermediate appel­
late court vacated the order. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 389 
N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), 
afI'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
24. 443 U.S. at 378. 
25. Id. at 383-84. 
26. While criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a public trial, they 
do not have the right to compel a private trial. The court may veto a waiver of the 
constitutional right. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
27. 443 U.S. at 383. 
28. Id. at 384. See also notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text. 
729 1980] ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS 
rights29 and that the public trial rule was not one of them. The 
rule merely establishes the norm of openness which is presumed 
by the sixth amendment. 30 This, of course, stops short of saying 
that the amendment requires openness. The Court found it unnec­
essary to rule on whether the amendment was intended by the 
Framers to incorporate the "rule" of openness as a requirement be­
cause it determined that the common law treated pre-trial proceed­
ings, like the one under review, differently from full trials. They 
were never characterized by the same degree of openness as were 
actual trials. 31 Therefore, even if the sixth amendment incorpora­
ted the common-law rule of openness, it would not extend to this 
case, a pre-trial hearing. 
But to adhere to this reasoning, given the facts in Gannett, 
one must exalt form over substance, because suppression hearings, 
like the one at issue here, took place at trial in open court at com­
mon law. 32 They, therefore, must be considered part of the trial 
for purposes of applying common-law or constitutional notions of 
openness. The pre-trial hearings to which the common law at­
tached no presumption of openness were typically preliminary pro­
ceedings, on the order of probable cause hearings,33 held before an 
indictment was returned or before a person was bound over for 
trial. 
29. 443 U.S. at 384. The Court cited the common-law right to a jury trial as an 
example of a common-law rule which was given constitutional recognition. The 
common-law rule that jurors could testify against a defendant is one which has been 
rejected. Id. at 385. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 387-88. 
32. Id. at 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The pre-trial suppression hearing is 
the close equivalent of a trial on the merits for purposes of applying public trial doc­
trine. It is often of critical importance, and may be decisive in the prosecution of a 
criminal case. Its outcome, especially where a confession is concerned, may virtually 
dictate the outcome of the case. Id. at 434-37. 
Moreover, such hearings are often the only judicial proceedings of importance 
that occur during a criminal prosecution, offering the public its only opportunity to 
view the legal and factual issues. This is because, nationwide, most felony prosecu­
tions are terminated without a trial on the merits. Id. at 434-35. 
Perhaps most importantly, suppression hearings typically involve allegations of 
police or prosecution misconduct. Such misconduct by public officials is a matter for 
public concern. The hearing will usually be the only opportunity the public will 
have to learn of misconduct, since the evidence ille.gally produced will normally not 
be allowed to surface at trial. Id. at 435-36. 
33. Id. at 437. The distinction between preliminary and non-preliminary pro­
ceedings is that the former lead to a trial vel non, and the latter may lead to a convic­
tion. Id. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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Having decided to rely on the common-law trial/pre-trial dis­
tinction nonetheless, the Gannett majority announced, in a case 
which arose in a pre-trial hearing, that members of the public have 
no constitutional right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments 
to attend criminal trials. 34 This declaration came despite the 
Court's misplaced reliance (since suppression hearings were histor­
ically held at trial) on English notions of pre-trial openness, the ab­
sence of need for such a broad ruling to decide the case, and the 
historically different treatment which the Court acknowledged was 
accorded to trials. 
Curiously, while the Court's analysis of the sixth amendment 
public right to attend trials is long and detailed, study of the first 
amendment as a basis for the right, which was also urged by 
Gannett, was given short shrift. Assuming, without deciding, that 
the first and fourteenth amendments provided a guarantee of ac­
cess in the case, the Court declared that the trial court had given 
appropriate deference to that right by balancing the constitutional 
rights of the press and the public against the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. The trial court's decision that there was a "reasonable 
probability of prejudice to these defendants" was enough to over­
come a first amendment right of access, assuming, as the trial 
judge did, that that right existed under the circumstances. 35 
The four-Justice dissent,36 written by Justice Blackmun, con­
tains a long discussion of the history of the public trial guarantee, 
and concludes that the right is not personal to the defendant, but 
inheres in the public. Blackmun traced a rationale for the right 
based on the public interest in the impartial administration of just­
ice and the necessity of safeguarding the truthfulness of testimony. 
The dissent found no evidence in the history of the common-law 
public trial right or the colonial public trial provisions that pre­
dated the Constitution to indicate that the Founders intended the 
sixth amendment to be invocable only by defendants. 37 The dissent 
noted that the right to attend court proceedings is limited and may 
be overcome by a showing of strict and inescapable necessity to 
protect fair trial rights. 38 The dissent found that that showing was 
34. Id. at 443 U.S. at 391. 
35. Id. at 392-93. 
36. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, White and Marshall 
joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in part. 
37. Id. at 418-33. 
38. Id. at 439-40. 
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not made in Gannett. Since this point of view would be disposative 
of the case, the dissent did not deem it necessary to address the 
first amendment issue. 
C. Judicial Confusion Over Gannett 
The reaction to Gannett in the nation's trial courts was quick, 
confused and pervasive. The decision was rendered on July 2, 
1979. As of late August, trial judges had agreed to about half of 
some fifty requests to close courtrooms. A few judges barred the 
press but not the public, and others closed off not only pre-trial 
hearings but actual trials and sentencings. 39 In one case, a trial 
court set aside its pre-trial closure order, but required a newspa­
per's counsel to attend the proceedings to advise its reporter as to 
what information could be published. 40 In short, courts exhibited 
widely varying interpretations of what the Gannett decision had 
decided. 
The most obvious problem confronting trial courts was 
Gannett's applicability to full trials. The opinion said that there was 
no sixth or fourteenth amendment right to attend criminal trials. 
That language, however, was dicta in a case in which only the right 
to attend a pre-trial hearing was at issue. Some post-Gannett deci­
sions closed full trials, citing potentially prejudicial publicity. 41 
Others allowed the court to remain open,42 even in cases where 
there had been no press objection to closure,43 apparently on the 
39. TIME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82. 
40. Keene Publishing Corp. v. Superior Court, 406 A.2d 137 (1979) (require­
ment that ~ounsel advise the reporter as to what may be published is an unconsti­
tutional prior restraint). 
41. E.g., State v. Hudspeth, No. 54534 (Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Aug. 3, 
1979) (murder trial was closed after defense motion on the grounds that the jury 
might be prejudiced by news accounts of an incriminating tape recording that was to 
be presented in court outside of the jury's presenc'e). 
42. E.g., People v. Bartowsheski, No. 79CR-516 (18th Dist. Ct., Colo., 1979) 
(defense motion to close murder trial on grounds that news accounts mightprejudice 
impartial jury was denied) (prosecution opposed the motion); United States v. Barber, 
476 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. w. Va. 1979) (defense motion to close parts of rape trial to the 
press, but not to the public, or to gag the press on grounds that the jury might see 
news accounts of portions of trial conducted outside of their presence was denied) 
(prosecution and press objected). 
43. E.g., People v. Angus, No. 104-69-78 (Albany County Ct., N.Y., 1979) 
(motion by counsel for a witness to close a sodomy trial on grounds that news ac­
counts of the witness' testimony would prejudice his fair trial rights during his own 
trial on related charges denied) (defense counsel joined motion; press did not op­
pose). 
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theory that Gannett does not compel closure upon motion where 
the judge finds little potential prejudice. 44 
It is not surprising that trial judges came to disparate conclu­
sions as to the scope of Gannett, since even the Justices of the Su­
preme Court disagreed as to what it meant. In the months after 
the decision issued, four Supreme Court Justices made separate ex­
trajudicial statements about the case's significance. Chief Justice 
Burger said that judges who barred the press and the public from 
actual trials were misreading the decision. He suggested that 
judges were reading newspaper reports on the case instead of the 
decision itself.45 Justice Blackmun, who wrote the dissent, told a 
group of federal judges that the opinion allowed full trials to be 
closed. 46 Justice Powell emphasized that Gannett decided only the 
sixth amendment access question; there might be a first amend­
ment right to attend criminal trials. 47 Justice Stevens, however, 
declared the case to be consistent with previous Court denials of a 
right of the press to acquire information. 48 Chief Justice Burger 
had what should stand as the final word on the extrajudicial expli­
cations of Gannett. If jurists start publicly elaborating on their writ­
ten opinions, he said, "we'll all be in the SOUp."49 
III. Gannett SHOULD BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED 
Many of these elements of the Gannett opinion, such as the 
narrow interpretation of "public interest," the misapplication of the 
common-law rule, the overbroad holding and the failure to ad­
dress all the theories advanced in support of the right to attend, 
combined with the confusion following the decision, are good rea­
sons for restricting the case to its facts. The Court did not reach 
the first amendment issue. The majority felt that the trial court's 
handling of closure did not abuse the asserted first amendment 
right, assuming arguendo that it existed. Arguably, a first amend­
ment protected right of personal access to the courts should, in 
fact, be recognized. 50 Indeed, Justice Powell's concurring opinion 
in Gannett51 does recognize such a right. 52 Although Justice Powell 
44. See note 26 supra. 
45. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, at 17, col. 1. 
46. TIME, note 39 supra. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. 
49. N.Y. Times, note 45 supra. 
50. See notes 60-90 infra and accompanying text. 
51. 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring). 
52. See note 56 infra and accompanying text. 
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was the only member of the Court who expressed a first amend­
ment view, the four dissenters also found a right of access, albeit in 
the sixth amendment; and three of the four members of the 
Gannett majority53 did not rule out the possibility of a first amend­
ment right. 54 All of this indicates that, given the right case, per­
haps one where the putative first amendment right is dismissed as 
nonexistent without even the balancing act treatment accorded by 
the Gannett trial court, the Court may well find at least a limited 
first amendment right of access and begin the task of defining its 
parameters. 55 
53. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens; But see Stevens, 
Some Thoughts About A General Rule, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1979). Justice Stevens 
says that the "general rule" developed by the Court in applying the first amend­
ment: 
draws a sharp distinction between the dissemination of information or ideas, 
on the one hand, and the acquisition of newsworthy matter on the other. 
Whereas the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the former, 
it has never squarely held that the latter is entitled to any constitutional pro­
tection whatsoever. 
Id. at 602. Stevens finds many of the arguments advanced in favor of a right of access 
"unpersuasive", but feels debate on the issue is "constructive", and "maximizes the 
likelihood that legislators and other lawmakers will make constructive changes in the 
rules relating to access to governmental proceedings." Id. at 603-04. He appears to 
be solicitous to a legislative resolution of the issue of access. Id. at 605. 
54. Justice Rehnquist's Gannett concurrence contends that there is "no First 
Amendment right of access in the public or press to judicial or other governmental 
proceedings." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 404. 
55. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to consider the issue of personal ac­
cess to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 
(BNA) 1545 (Va., 1979), prob. juris. noted, 100 S.Ct. 204 (1979) (No. 79-243). The 
case involves a challenge to a Virginia statute which states that: "In the trial of all 
criminal cases ... the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons 
whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of 
the accused to a public trial shall not be violated...." VA. CODE ~ 19.2-266(1975). 
The trial court had excluded all members of the press and public from a murder 
trial without notice, a hearing or any evidence being adduced that fair trial rights 
were in jeopardy due to public attendance. The trial ended in two days. The court 
found the defendant not guilty, by reason of the insufficiency of the state's evidence. 
Virginia v. Stevenson, No. 68-A-77 (Hanover County Circuit Ct., Va. 1978). The 
Virginia Supreme Court denied relief to the appellant newspapers and reporters with 
a one-sentence reference to Gannett, seven days after the Supreme Court handed 
down that decision. 
The newspapers are contending that the right of access to criminal trials is a fun­
damental constitutional right. They submit that although there is no agreement as to 
the textual source of that right in the Constitution, the right is confirmed by shared 
experience and common understanding, informed but not wholly defined by the first 
and sixth amendments. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 17, Richmond News­
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, prob. juris. noted, 100 S.Ct. 204 (1979) (No. 79-243). 
The newspapers also assert that the Virginia statute violates the first, sixth, and 
fourteenth amendments by virtue of allowing closure without a showing of a threat 
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This is all the more likely because the Gannett majority is a 
fragile alliance. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, who 
joined Justice Stewart's majority opinion, construe the power of the 
courts to restrict access to their proceedings more narrowly than 
does the majority opinion itself Chief Justice Burger's concurring 
opinion emphasizes that trials and pre-trial hearings are different, 
historically governed by different presumptions of purpose and 
openness. He joined the Stewart opinion because the case dealt 
only with the pre-trial issue. Justice Powell concurred, but found a 
limited first amendment right of public access to criminal courts. 
To protect that right he would require, upon motion for closure: 
consideration of alternatives; a tailored closure order, extending no 
further than necessary to protect fair trial goals; an opportunity for 
those interested to be heard on the question of closure; and a 
showing by the defendant that public access will prejudice the fair­
ness of the trial. 56 Justice Powell concluded that the Gannett trial 
court procedure substantially complied with all of this, and he 
joined the majority opinion. The majority, however, requires only 
a balancing of fair trial and "putative" press rights of access; a "rea­
sonable probability of prejudice to these defendants" defeats the 
asserted press rights. That certainly does not approach the level of 
protection provided by Justice Powell's apparatus. So the Gannett 
opinion is an unsteady construction whose architects had different 
concepts of the edifice they were building. 
A final reason which militates for a narrow application of 
Gannett concerns the genesis of the majority opinion. Press reports 
indicate that the Gannett opinion was a result of a late-term vote 
switch that transformed the dissenting opinion into the majority. 
According to these accounts, both opinions were in nearly final 
form when the switch, attributed to Justice Powell, occurred. Just­
ice Blackmun's long analysis of the significance of public trials in 
the Anglo-American legal tradition was transformed from the ma­
jority opinion into a dissent, and the opinion for the Court was 
built around Justice Stewart's former dissent. Supposedly, in the 
pressure of finishing the Court's work by the end of the term, the 
new majority opinion did not receive normal scrutiny by other 
members of the majority. 57 
to a significant interest, without a discussion of alternatives, without a showing of the 
probable efficacy of closure, and without an effort to accommodate the right of access 
to the court. [d. at 22-26. 
56. 443 U.S. at 400-01 (Powell, J., concurring). 
57. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,1979, at A15, col. 1. 
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Since dissenting opinions are often more argumentative and 
more broadly worded than majority opinions, the apparent lack of 
close final editing meant that some members of the majority signed 
their names to language that went further than they intended. 58 
If this is true, it could explain the existence of the sweeping and 
unnecessary dicta in the Gannett majority opinion59 which has 
been responsible for much of the confusion in interpreting the 
case. These factors indicate that it would not be wise to extend the 
holding in Gannett beyond its facts. Under the circumstances, 
the opinion is simply not strong enough to support broader applica­
bility. 
IV. A FIRST AND NINTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF 

ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS 

A. Common Law Origins of the Right of Access 
The citizen's right of access to full trials had its ongm in the 
English common law. The practice of holding court proceedings in 
the open was already ancient and well established by Blackstone's 
time. 6o It developed at a time when procedural safeguards for the 
accused were uncommon. 61 The English cases indicate that the 
public trial was perceived as a device to serve the interest of mem­
bers of the public in the integrity of the court system apart from 
and, if necessary, in opposition to the interests of the individual 
defendant. 62 English courts recognized that such a policy could be 
to the disadvantage of defendants, but held that this effect was out­
weighed by the need to make the proceedings of the courts known 
to common citizens. 63 The right of citizen access to trials was 
58. Id. 
59. See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text. 
60. One commentator says the English rule of openness dates from time imme­
morial. E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967). The public trial 
had its origins in the English custom of trial by the community, which predated the 
Norman invasion of 1066. Since that time, there has been a continuous tradition of 
community participation in English criminal trials. Even the trials of the notorious 
Star Chamber were always held in public, which probably led to its demise as pub­
lic opinion was aroused against it. Note, Legal History: Origins of the Public. Trial, 
35 IND. L. J., 251, 251-54 (1960); See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 847 
(3d CiT. 1978) (district court order excluding the public from a pretrial suppression 
hearing and sealing the record of the hearing reversed on first and sixth amendment 
grounds as being more restrictive than necessary under the circumstances). 
61. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 423 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. 
63. See, e.g., The King v. Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399 (K.B. 1799). 
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thought to be founded in public necessity, and was distinguished 
from the right to attend pre-trial hearings. 64 This concept predates 
the development of the complementary notion of the public trial as 
a procedural safeguard of defendants' rights. 65 The English cases 
indicate that the public necessity idea was the better developed 
one at the time of the formation of the American republic. 66 
B. Purpose of the Right 
In the abstract, the right to inspect the functioning of govern­
ment institutions is concommitant to the inherent power of the citi­
zenry to direct government, principally through the vote and the 
power to petition and to act through elected representatives. Di­
rection cannot take place in a vacuum of information. 67 The right 
to observe fosters the intelligent discussion of government afIairs68 
[Ilt is one of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice that its proceedings 
should be public, and that all parties who may be desirous of hearing what 
is going on, if there be room in the place for that purpose,-provided they 
do not interrupt the proceedings, and provided there is no specific reason 
why they should be removed,-have a right to be present for the purpose of 
hearing what is going on. 
Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829). "The general advantage to 
the country in having these proceedings made public, more than counterbalances the 
inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such 
proceedings." The King v. Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399 (K.B. 1799). 
The publication of proceedings in courts of justice, where both sides are 
heard, and matters are finally determined, is salutary, and therefore it is 
permitted .... Trials at law fairly reported, although they may occasionally 
prove injurious to individuals, have been held to be privileged. The benefit 
they produce is great and permanent, and the evil that arises from them is 
rare and incidental. 
Rex v. Fisher, 170 Eng.Rep. 1253, 1255 (K.B. 1811). 
64. "[Tlhese preliminary examinations have no such privilege. Their only tend­
ency is to prejudice those whom the law still presumes to be innocent, and to poison 
the sources of justice." Rex v. Fisher, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253, 1255 (K.B. 1811). The 
English common law notion of "preliminary hearing" is limited to proceedings 
preceeding the binding over a defendant for trial, however. It does not include sup­
pression hearings. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text. 
65. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 423-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
66. "Indeed the first public trial provision to appear in America spoke in terms 
of the right of the public, not the accused, to attend trials." Id. (citing CONCESSIONS 
AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (1677), ch. XXIII, reprinted in 1 
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971». 
67. See note 88 supra. 
68. The first amendment embodies a system of freedom of expression. See note 
83 infra and accompanying text. A "main function of a system of freedom of expres­
sion is to provide for participation in decision-making through a process of open 
discussion which is available to all members of the community." Everyone is enti­
tled to participate in this process of formulating decisions. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A 
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-9 (1966). 
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and allows the public to meaningfully exercise its powers. Public 
scrutiny has an even more direct effect on government conduct. 
Since the parties to that conduct must act in the open, any impro­
prieties are immediately laid bare for public inspection. Acts may 
be done in private which the actor would not be bold enough to do 
in public. 69 Publicity, therefore, has a deterrent effect on misuse of 
the institutions of government, thereby increasing their effective­
ness and the public's respect for them. 70 
In practice, as applied to the court system, this translates into 
an enhancement of the courts' fact finding function and a safeguard 
against abuses of the judicial system. 71 Witnesses are more likely 
to overcome the temptation to perjure themselves in public pro­
ceedings. 72 Publicly reported testimony is capable of bringing forth 
"[S]uppression of information ... prevents one from reaching the most rational 
judgment, blocks the generation of new ideas, and tends to perpetuate error." Id. at 
7. Society's judgments are made up of individual judgments. A judgment of society is 
therefore "vitally conditioned by the quality of the individual judgments which com­
pose it." Id. at 8. Open discussion and access to the information that makes it possi­
ble are therefore imperatives for rational social judgments. 
69. "[A] witness may frequently depose that in private which he will be 
ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM­
MENTARIES *373. 
70. The right to inspect government may be applicable to many different gov­
ernment bodies and institutions and may be affected by the character of their pro­
ceedings. The interaction between the right and the necessity of effective govern­
ment opens up a vast field of inquiry, most of which is beyond the scope of this 
comment. For an initial inquiry into the right to inspect government and govern­
ment's attempts to deal with it, see Bagley, Impact of the Sunshine Act on the Pub­
lic's Access to Information and on the Internal Operations of Government Agencies, 
34 Bus. LAW. 1075 (1979); Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 Of The Administrative 
Procedure Act: The Freedom Of Information Act; The Privacy Act; And The Govern­
ment In The Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1978); Ward, The Public's Access 
to Government-Freedom of Information, Privacy and Sunshine Acts: An Address, 
70 LAW LIB. J. 509 (1977); Comment, Government In The Sunshine Act: A Danger 
Of Overexposure, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 620 (1977); Note, The Government In The Sun­
shine Act-An Overview, 1977 DUKE L. J. 565; Note, The Federal "Government In 
The Sunshine Act": A Public Access Compromise, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 881 (1977). 
71. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous re­
view in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of ju­
dicial power." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). This was a habeas corpus pro­
ceeding brought by a defendant sentenced to jail for contempt by a Michigan 
"one-man grand jury," who ruled that contempt was in order because the defend­
ant's story did not "jell" with other secret testimony. The summary manner in which 
the defendant was jailed, pursuant to a proceeding in the secrecy of grand jury cham­
bers, was held violative of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Id. at 257. 
72. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. Hj69) (holding that a suppres­
sion hearing, held at trial with the jury sequestered, must be conducted as a public 
trial where there is a question of witness credibility and where the judge alone de­
termines the ultimate outcome). 
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witnesses to dispute or add to what has been adduced. 73 Biases of 
judges and abuses of their power may be discovered or tempered, 
and their fitness for office disclosed. 74 Improper police activity will 
come to light, and abuses by other officers of the court will also be 
made public. 75 More is involved here than an interest in protecting 
the fair trial rights of the particular defendant. Witnesses or non­
parties may be abused by the judge, whose conduct may reveal 
much about his fitness to fill his office, even though the acts do not 
prejudice the defendant. The defendant himself may be the benefi­
ciary of the misdeeds. 76 
Open trials are in part based on the concern that nonparties 
with a stake in the litigation need an opportunity to observe the 
course of the trial or to read accounts of it in the press. This is part 
of a larger concern with the appearance of justice, which is en­
hanced by revelation of the testimonial and evidential bases upon 
which judicial determinations are founded. "This opens the pro­
cesses of government to the citizenry, and builds confidence in the 
judicial system. "77 Since everyone has a stake in the outcome of 
criminal trials, in that societal wrongs are redressed and members 
of the public are protected from those who have demonstrated a 
propensity to do them harm, every citizen has a need to observe 
the criminal justice system. This is an outgrowth of the necessity of 
public confidence in government institutions. 78 Those institutions 
73. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). See note 71 supra. 
74. Id. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). The Court cited ex­
amples of the cleanSing effect the press has on government to support its holding 
that a state act providing penalties for newspaper editorials on election day, urging 
people to vote a certain way, violated the Constitution's free press guarantee. Id. at 
214. 
75. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 853 (3d Cir. 1978). For an ex­
tensive theoretical discussion of the sources, premises and ramifications of the first 
amendment function in checking abuses of official power, see Blasi, The Checking 
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 523, 
591-611. . 
76. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 853 (3d Cir. 1978). 
77. Id. See note 71 supra. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). 
78. The public has an independent right to be present to see that justice is 
fairly done. It is important that our citizens be free to observe court proceed­
ings to insure a sense of confidence in the judicial process. Conducting trials 
behind closed doors might engender an apprehension and distrust of the le­
gal system.... 
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In a suppression 
proceeding relating to the secret airline "hijacker profile," the court ruled that exclu­
sion of the public from the part of the proceeding dealing with the profile did not vi­
olate the right to a public trial. Id. at 1077. 
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can be fully effective only if there is respect for their decisions and 
for the people and methods involved in their formulation. 79 If the 
institutions are not operating effectively, the people have the right 
to observe the ills and formulate a remedy under our system of 
government. 
C. The First Amendment 
There is practically universal agreement that a major purpose 
of the first amendment was to protect the free discussion and scru­
tiny of governmental affairs.80 Commentary and reporting on the 
criminal justice system is at the core of first amendment values. 81 
For practical reasons, individual citizens are unable to person­
ally gather all the information they need and are entitled to in or­
der to make informed decisions about the courts. They depend on 
the press. 82 The first amendment reflects the intent of the amend­
ment's framers that the press be unhindered in its endeavors to re­
port that which the public itself has a right to experience. 83 Access 
79. "Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance ac­
quired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies 
is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy." 6 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834 (3d rev. ed. 1970). 
80. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See note 74 supra. 
81. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
[Tlhe operation and integrity of ... [the criminal justice] system is of crucial 
import to citizens concerned with the administration of Government. Se­
crecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and 
suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of judges; free and ro­
bust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding 
of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire 
criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by sub­
jecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability. 
Id. See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) 
(Virginia statute forbidding anyone to divulge the proceedings of a judicial review 
committee held to be incompatible with the first amendment). 
82. "[T]he operation of the judicial system ... is a matter of public interest, 
necessarily engaging the attention of the news media." Landmark Communications, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978). 
83. Leading first amendment theorist Thomas I. Emerson asserts that the root 
purpose of the amendment was to assure an effective system of freedom of expres­
sion. He says that the system's: 
adoption and its continued acceptance imply that some fundamental deci­
sions with respect to reconciliation have been made, that a certain major bal­
ancing of interests has already been performed. These judgments, these 
prior balancings, are those which necessarily flow from the decision to put 
into operation a system of free expression, with all the values that such a 
system is intended to secure, in the realistic context of the actual func­
tioning of society and its legal institutions. 
740 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:723 
of the press to information has been restricted by the Court only 
where there is a restriction on the public. 84 
A free press is the only guarantee a citizen has that he may ef­
fectively exercise his right to know what is going on in govern­
ment. 85 As applied to the criminal justice system, this means that 
members of the public are entitled to information about what is 
happening to the accused. There is no other way for the majority 
of citizens who cannot attend court and observe cases to evaluate 
the judicial system's administration of justice except through the 
media. Even while reviewing a case characterized as a "media cir­
cus," the Court was able to say that a responsible press is the 
"handmaiden of effective judicial administration," especially in the 
criminal field. 86 
In light of this judicial recognition of the role of trial publicity 
as an element of the public's right to oversee government in action 
and the function of the first amendment in securing this right, it is 
beyond question that criminal trial closures implicate more than 
the sixth amendment public trial guarantee. Closure implicates an 
interest which has its roots in the first amendment. That amend­
ment protects the free discussion of government affairs so that citi­
zens can make intelligent appraisals of government institutions, 
their operation, and the people who run them. 87 Ultimately, the 
EMERSON, supra note 68, at 59. One such judgment is that expression is to be freely 
allowed and encouraged. Id. "Expression," as Emerson uses the tenn, encompasses 
more than mere verl?alization or memorialization of ideas. It is part of a continuum 
along which an idea is fonnulated, discussed, refined, assigned a niche in the hier­
archy of ideas and implemented. The first amendment protects "expression," as op­
posed to "action." The distinction rests on the immediacy and irremediability of the 
effect of the activity. The more immediate and irremediable the purported effect, 
(hann to fair trial rights, in the case of criminal trial access) the farther the activity 
shifts to the "action" end of the action/expression continuum. Id. at 60. The right of 
access can be protected without immediate or irremediable adverse effect on fair 
trial rights. See notes 139-56 infra and accompanying text. 
84. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text. 
85. See State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 
467,351 N.E.2d 127, 134 (1976) (an order excluding the public and barring the press 
from publishing reports on a suppression hearing was held violative of the first and 
sixth amendments). 
86. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 350. "Its function in this regard is docu­
mented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not 
simply publish infonnation about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice 
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scru­
tiny and criticism." Id. 
87. Justice William Brennan says that there are two distinct and legitimate 
models of the role of the first amendment. The first is the "speech" model. "Accord­
ing to this traditional 'speech' model, the primary purpose of the First Amendment is 
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citizens' right to prompt change when they identify a need cannot 
be meaningful unless there is a right of access to the information 
which will allow intelligent, fully informed discussion. 88 This inter­
est is not too remote from the first amendment to benefit from 
constitutional protection. It militates for more than "a common-law 
more or less absolutely to prohibit any interference with freedom of expression." 
Brennan, Why Protect the Press?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.lFeb. 1980, 59, at 
60. 
The model which applies to trial closure, however, is the second, "structural," 
model. This model is based on the idea that: 
[T]he First Amendment protects the structure of communications necessary 
for the existence of our democracy. This insight suggests the second model 
to describe the role of the press in our society. This second model is struc­
tural in nature. It focuses on the relationship of the press to the communica­
tive functions required by our democratic beliefs. To the extent the press 
makes these functions possible, this model requires that it receive the pro­
tection of the First Amendment. A good example is the press's role in pro­
viding and circulating the information necessary for informed public 
discussion. To the extent the press, or, for that matter, to the extent that any 
institution uniquely performs this role, it should receive unique First 
Amendment protection. 
[d. Brennan says that the protection accorded under the first model is absolute. That 
accorded under the "structural" model involves protection of interests which "may 
conflict with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on occasion favors 
the competing claim." [d. 
88. The [First] Amendment therefore also forbids the government from 
interfering with the communicative process through which we citizens exer­
cise and prepare to exercise our rights of self-government. The individual 
right to speak out, even millions of such rights aggregated together, will not 
sufficiently protect these social interests. It is in recognition of this fact that 
. . . the Court has referred to "the circulation of information to which the 
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guarantees." 
[d. (emphasis supplied by Justice Brennan) (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)). 
Intelligent self-government requires that the electorate be sufficiently 
informed of the problems that face the country and of the potential solutions 
of those problems. The first amendment stands as a bar to government re­
strictions placed on the publication of information necessary for enlightened 
public policy and electoral decisionmaking. But if the citizenry has no ef­
fective means to gain this information, even an expansive right to dissemi­
nate available information is of little value. In other areas courts have recog­
nized that simply granting a right to do something is not sufficient if it is 
impossible to take advantage of such a grant. For example, because the right 
to an attorney in a criminal action means little if one cannot afford to hire an 
attorney, government has fostered the right by providing appointed attor­
neys. The argument that the goals of the first amendment require an accom­
panying right to gather news proceeds on much the same analysis. 
Pember, The Burgeoning Scope of "Access Privacy" and the Portent for a Free 
Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1155, 1166 (1979). See also note 68 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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rule of open .. criminal proceedings. "89 The ninth amendment 
bestows constitutional protection on fundamental personal rights 
even if they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitu­
tional amendments. 9o The histories of the first and ninth amend­
ments combine to indicate that the right of access to criminal trials 
is a fundamental personal right and is due constitutional respect 
under those amendments. 
D. The Ninth Amendment 
1. Purpose of the Amendment 
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
PIe. "91 
This, the ninth amendment, was a product of the apprehen­
sion of its author, James Madison, that the Bill of Rights might be 
construed as a denial of unenumerated rights or as a grant of fed­
eral power in the areas not covered by the enumeration. 92 Madison 
inserted the amendment into the Bill of Rights out of caution, 93 
despite the fact that the framers of the Constitution upheld the 
English tradition that basic, natural, and fundamental individual 
rights were protected whether enumerated specifically in a consti­
tution or not. 94 But the amendment is more than an exclamation 
point on the doctrine that the federal government is one of dele­
gated and enumerated powers. 95 An amendment that protects 
unenumerated rights is pointless without unenumerated rights to 
89. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 384. 
90. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(Connecticut anti-contraception law ruled unconstitutional as invading a zone of pri­
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees). 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
92. [Bly enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would 
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it 
might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not signalled out, 
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government 
and were consequently insecure. 
B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 13 (1955) (quoting Madison, 1 
ANNALS OF CONGo 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834). The ninth amendment is almost 
exclusively the work of Madison. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
93. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 13. 
94. Id. at 7. 
95. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L. J. 
309, 323 (1936). 
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protect. The Founders did not indulge in irrelevant exercise. 96 
Unenumerated rights must exist. 97 The amendment underscores 
the idea that certain rights may have been unintentionally omitted 
from the Bill of Rights, and that the inadequacy of language to ex­
press certain ideals might adversely affect other rights intended to 
be included. 98 
In short, there can be little doubt as to the existence of pro­
tected, but unenumerated rights. Madison's writings indicate that 
the ninth amendment was borne of his belief in the impossibility of 
a comprehensive description of personal rights. Moreover, the 
English concept of inherent individual liberties, existing ir­
respective of government, was pervasive among the framers of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The last thought in their minds 
was to construct a constitution as a grant to the individual of inher­
ent rights and liberties. 99 It was a conveyance of powers to the fed­
eral government from the people and no more. Individual inherent 
rights and liberties were thought to antedate and occupy a level 
above constitutions; they were pre-constitutional rights. 100 They in­
here in the nature of man and subordinate his constitutions. Since 
the Constitution is incompetent to grant or fully describe a citizen's 
rights, it cannot be evidence against the existence of a right, but 
can only indicate the undisputed recognition of some and the ne­
cessity of others, in light of the human condition. 
In sum, the ninth amendment is notice both that the Bill of 
Rights is not all-inclusive, and that those rights listed may have 
96. It has been held that in interpreting the Constitution, every word must 
have its due force and meaning; that no word was unnecessarily used or 
needlessly added; that no word can be rejected as superfluous and unmean­
ing. 
With this rule in mind we must therefore assume that in the minds of 
the framers of this amendment, other rights than those "enumerated" did, 
and supposedly do now, exist. 
[d. at 312-13. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
97. The ninth amendment: 

must be more than a mere net to catch fish in supposedly fishless water. 

.. : It must be a positive declaration of existing, though unnamed rights, 

which may be vindicated under the authority of the amendment whenever 

and if ever any governmental authority shall aspire to ungranted power in 

contravention of "unenumerated rights." 

Kelsey, supra note 95, at 313. 
98. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained By the People"?, 37 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 787, 805 (1962). 
99. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 19. 
100. [d. at 20. 
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been inadequately or incompletely described. It stands for the con­
cept that rights are not created by their expression in constitutional 
writings, but merely acknowledged, and, on occasion, without ade­
quate description. The amendment sanctions the search for rights 
not enumerated. Of greater potential importance, however, is its 
sanction of intra- and extra-constitutional illumination of the enu­
merated rights beyond their black letters, where those letters do 
not by themselves convey the breadth and limits of the protection 
which the rights afford. The concern which gave birth to the 
amendment indicate that the term "unenumerated rights" was 
meant to encompass both concepts. lOl 
2. The Unenumerated Rights 
The unenumerated rights may be identified through analysis of 
two paradigms. The first is the English concept of inherent per­
sonal rights, which were fought for in the Revolutionary War. 102 
The rights listed by Blackstone are probably more exact statements 
of those rights which the Founders intended to protect in the Con­
stitution and the ninth amendment than any other theoretical or 
philosophic compilation and classification of rights. lo3 Blackstone 
said that these rights consist primarily of the free enjoyment of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property, with a 
supportive infrastructure of subsidiary rightS. 104 
The second pattern which may be used to identify un­
enumerated rights is the Constitution itself. The ninth amendment 
101. "The fear that certain rights may have been omitted, and that the vagaries 
of language might adversely affect other rights intended to be included, led Madison 
to the Ninth Amendment." Redlich, supra note 98, at 805. An important factor to 
keep in mind with regard to the identification of unenumerated rights, be they rights 
unnamed in the Constitution, or emanations of enumerated rights, is that the rights 
protected by the ninth amendment are not fixed by the date of the amendment's 
adoption. The amendment was intended to be a living document. As the American 
nation and government grows and develops, the necessity of "new" rights may be­
come apparent in the light of current history. The spirit of the constitution and the 
letter of the ninth amendment demand that these rights be recognized and protected. 
PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 53-56. 
102. The Founding Fathers were children of the English political milieu. They 
were not concerned with fashioning a system of rights from whole cloth, but with 
perfecting the acquisition of English rights. "The Colonists had argued, petitioned 
and contended, and finally waged war, not for philosophic perfection of any utilitar­
ian doctrine of rights, but for the rights of Englishmen." Kelsey, supra note 95, at 
313. 
103. Id. at 313-14. Blackstone's Commentaries were heavily circulated in colo­
nial America. Id. at 313. 
104. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143-44. 
745 1980] ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS 
refers to rights retained by the people despite the enumeration of 
other rights in the Constitution,105 as opposed to the Bill of Rights. 
The whole text of the Constitution, therefore, becomes the 
standard for analysis of potential ninth amendment rights. 106 The 
sense, the aura, the gist of what the Constitution establishes, the 
essence of the institutions it ordains, are as informative of the pre­
rogatives of citizenship as the enumerations of the first eight 
amendments. For the Constitution establishes more than the 
pieces of government; it establishes an idea. That idea is an image 
of a free and open society.107 It is a system that was truly intended 
to be a government of and by the people. The constitutional scheme 
was designed so that the citizenry would have the right to the raw 
material, the knowledge, which is essential to the exercise of its ul­
timate power of government,108 reflected in the Constitution's 
portrayal of a free and open society. 
But the ninth amendment recognized that it is impossible to 
fill in every detail of this image. For that reason certain rights were 
reserved to the people. 109 The unenumerated rights, then, are 
those pieces necessary to complete the picture of the free, open so­
ciety which is framed by the Constitution. These rights were re­
tained by the people not because they were different from the 
rights . specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but because 
words were considered inadequate to define all the rights which 
man should possess in a free society.110 So the ninth amendment 
fills in the blanks, defining rights adjacent or analogous to the pat­
tern of rights which we find in the Constitution. 1ll It stands for the 
proposition that the enumerated rights and the essences of the so­
ciety envisioned by the Constitution are not to be eviscerated by 
the non-enumeration of rights necessary to their fulfillment. To the 
extent that a putative right is necessary to give full effect to the so­
cial order of the Constitution, it exists and is due constitutional 
protection. 112 
105. See text accompanying note 91 supra. 
106. Redlich, supra note 98, at BlO. 
107. ld. 
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
109. Redlich, supra note 98, at B10. 

1l0. ld. at Bll. 

lll. ld. at B12. 

112. One ninth amendment commentator, Bennett Patterson, has stressed the 
idea that the rights protected by the amendment are necessarily "personal" rights, as 
opposed to public or collective ones. "Personal" rights are those which actively con­
fer the right to do or refrain from doing something, and provide that the forge of gov­
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3. The Ninth Amendment Protects Access to Criminal Trials 
The right of access to criminal trials is a detail of the first 
amendment that was not filled in. The first amendment was en­
acted in part to allow effective and informed citizen participation in 
the exercise of the right of citizenship. Without the right to ob­
serve government in operation, the rights to discuss it, to form 
opinions about it, and to act on those impressions are gutted. This 
result cannot have been countenanced by the Founders in view of 
the open and free society the Constitution embodies. The Court 
has recognized that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance. 113 The right of access to criminal 
ernment stands behind the individual who asserts it, against all who would deny it. 

The ninth amendment protects rights which individuals must have if they are to 

fully develop their potentials as citizens in the framework of the Constitution. This 

contrasts with "public" rights, which are those characterized by government inaction 

in an area. The "public right" is merely a function of the absence of government reg­

ulation resulting in lack of restraint on the masses. It exists until government legally 

acts to deny, restrict or define it. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 60-61. For example, 

the right to engage in the manufacture, sale or transportation of liquor was a public 

right, unrestrained by government, until the eighteenth amendment was adopted, 

denying it. It became such a right again when the twenty-first amendment removed 

the restrictions. Government restriction in an area of public right (e.g. health 

standards on manufacture of liquor; zoning standards on its sale) does not deny the 

right, but sets its boundaries. Patterson theorizes that collective rights are protected 

by the "General Welfare" clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. PATTERSON, supra note 92, 

at 57. Other commentators call Patterson's "personal" rights "natural" or "inherent." 

Natural rights, such as are declared to be inalienable and which, as such, are 

personal to every individual as a citizen of a free community, include: the 

right to personal liberty, to personal security, to acquire and enjoy property, 

to religious liberty, to freedom of conscience, to freedom of contract, to free­

dom of the press, speech, assemblage, petition, to freedom to engage in a 

profession, trade, business, or calling, and the right of privacy. 
Kelsey, supra note 95, at 313 (and at 310 on the personal/public right distinction). 
The right of access is a personal one. It has historically been recognized as inci­
dent to the citizen's right to inspect the government. It is not a right capable of exer­
cise merely because of a lack of government regulation. To the extent that govern­
ment has not acted to regulate access, it has been in recognition of the Court's own 
admission that "there is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as 
distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or 
censor events which transpire in proceedings before it." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 
367, 374 (1947). To the extent that the courts do attempt to unduly restrict access, 
they act in derogation of the individual's right. It is a right of the type protected by 
the ninth amendment, because the individual claims an enforceable right to observe, 
born of necessity inherent in the concept of open government and his other rights 
under it. It is much more than a wish to be left unregulated as to an activity which 
has not been subjected to an exercise of government power. 
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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trials properly belongs on the list of rights114 emanating from the 
first amendment. It is necessary to the fulfillment of the American 
constitutional scheme of openness and to the accomplishment of 
the informed discussion protected by the first amendment. It must, 
therefore, qualify for the protection of the ninth amendment, 
which confers constitutional status on emanations of enumerated 
rights when those emanations are necessary to the completion of 
the constitutional scheme. The right of access is a personal115 and 
fundamental116 right of the citizen, a detail of his first amendment 
rights, and necessary to that amendment's intended operation. 
That the right of access to criminal trials was not specified in 
the first amendment is easily explained. The amendment would 
have been incredibly unwieldy had it spelled out every context in 
which a right of citizen access is necessary to a meaningful exercise 
of other first amendment guarantees. Yet it cannot be argued that 
the right of access is not "adjacent" to the amendment, that is, a 
right necessary to the fulfillment of first amendment intent. For 
what is a right of free speech, without a source of information for 
that speech? To what avail is one encouraged to discuss his govern­
ment, and assured a free press to help him, if that government 
seals its institutions from observation? The right of access makes 
the first amendment meaningful, with regard to the criminal courts. 
The final evidence that the right of access qualifies for consti­
tutional protection under the ninth amendment umbrella is that ac­
cess was a part of the system of English rights which the Founders 
intended to incorporate into the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 117 
Blackstone, the period's principal expositor of English rights, was 
perhaps the single most influential source of the Founders' con­
cepts of personal rights. 11s He posited three primary rights: per­
sonal security; personal liberty; and private property.119 These 
rights are secured and protected by a system of auxiliary subordinate 
rights. 120 Blackstone saw the right of access to criminal courts as a 
114. [d. at 482. 
115. See note 112 supra. 
116. The test of whether a right is fundamental is whether it has become so 
rooted in the nation's collective conscience that its denial violates fundamental prin­
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institu­
tions. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), on the nature of fundamental rights. 
117. See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text. 
118. Kelsey, supra note 95, at 313-14. 
119. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141. 
120. But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained and protected 
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necessary outgrowth of the subordinate right of every Englishman 
to apply to the courts for redress of injuries. 121 There are two 
bases for this construction. The first is that criminal offenses harm 
not only the victim of the crime, but the citizens of the govern­
ment which formulates and enforces the laws defining the crime. 
Criminal offenses are an affront to the code of lawful behavior, es­
tablished through the democratic process, which citizens use to 
govern the limits of their conduct in a sort of quid pro quo ex­
change for the expectation that others will similarly honor the sys­
tem. In the breach of that expectation every citizen is harmed, 
since the ability of the law to function as a code of civility upon 
which the citizen may rely for his safety, health and the protection 
of his property is undermined. In effect, then, the criminal prose­
cution becomes the application of all citizens to the court for re­
dress of injury to their reliance interest in the system of civility. 
Since every citizen is thus a party to every criminal action, he has 
a party's right to observe the court system's handling of it. 
The second element which forms the right of access to the 
courts is the requirement that justice "be duly administered 
therein. "122 Blackstone recognized the salutary effects of publicity 
in the conduct of justice;123 the echoes of that recognition still 
sound in the decisions of American courts. 124 
by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other 
method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has, therefore, established cer­
tain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally 
as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and 
primary rights.... 
Id. at *140-41. 
121. "Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man's life, lib­
erty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject; and the 
law be duly administered therein." Id. at *141. By his reference to the arbitration of 
life and liberty, Blackstone clearly includes access to the criminal courts within the 
scope of this right. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. [Ajll ... evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence of the 
parties, their attorneys, the counsel and all bystanders, and before the judge 
and jury; ... exceptions are publicly stated, and by the judge are openly and 
publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country: which must curb 
any secret bias or partiality that might arise in his own breast.... This open 
examination of witnesses ... , in the presence of all mankind, is much more 
conducive to the clearing up of truth than ... private and secret examina­
tion.... [Aj witness may frequently depose that in private which he will be 
ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal. 
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73. 
124. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text. 
749 1980] ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Even if one were to disbelieve that the Founders intended to 
incorporate their heritage of traditional English rights into the 
Constitution through the ninth amendment, the Constitution itself 
argues persuasively for a personal right of access to criminal courts. 
This is simply because the criminal courts are engaged in the 
formal conduct of government business, and the right of access to 
government proceedings by the people as a check on the function 
of the system is an integral and necessary part of our form of gov­
ernment. It is premised in the power of citizens to control, how­
ever indirectly through the legislative and elective process, the 
way in which the government will operate and to hold it account­
able to them. 
So the right of the common citizen to observe criminal trials is 
more than a mere "interest." It has an ancient origin and exists in­
dependently of defendants' rights to a fair trial. It is a way of pro­
tecting the integrity of our system and is incorporated into the 
Constitution by the ninth amendment. 125 Its abridgement by the 
states is constrained by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. 126 
125. The ninth amendment has frequently been linked with the tenth amend­
ment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro­
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Neither has seen extensive judicial use, although the tenth 
amendment is enjoying a limited revival of sorts. See, e.g., National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act may not be applied to state employees); Fry v. United 
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (wage "freeze" legislation may be applied to state em­
ployees). These cases reject the old idea that the tenth amendment is a mere 
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered." 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The court in Fry held that the 
tenth amendment forbids the exercise of federal power "in a fashion that impairs the 
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." Fry v. 
United States, 421 U.S. at 547. The Court in Fry, however, did not address the 
amendment's last four words, which make it a complement to the ninth amendment: 
The last four words of the Tenth Amendment must have been added to con­
form its meaning to the Ninth Amendment and to carry out the intent of 
both-that as to the federal government there were rights, not enumerated 
in the Constitution, which were "retained ... by the people," and that be­
cause the people possessed such rights there were powers which neither the 
federal government nor the states possessed. 
Redlich, supra note 98, at 807. 
The reliance on the ninth amendment by Justice Goldberg in his concurring 
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur­
ring; joined by Warren, C.J. and· Brennan, J.), is the lonely modem example of the 
use of either the ninth or tenth amendment to vindicate a right or power in the indi­
vidual not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. The ninth amendment in par­
ticular remains one of the great unmined veins of American constitutional law. 
126. Patterson contends that the amendment was intended to apply to the 
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E. Other Questions 
The establishment of a constitutional right of access to criminal 
trials raises many subsidiary questions of interest, not all of which 
can be addressed here. Two issues, though, merit some discussion. 
The first is squaring the right with the Pell, Saxbe and Houchins 
line of Supreme Court cases,127 denying a public right of access to 
prisons. Prisons are, of course, an arm of government. Everything 
said thus far about a generalized right of access to government 
applies with equal force to prisons. Yet there is a difference which 
militates for applying the right of access to criminal trials and 
denying it for prisons. The difference is that prisons are generally 
closed, and courtrooms are generally open, for good reason. To say 
that because the press and public may be barred from one, they 
may also be barred from the other suggests a disturbing 
insensitivity to the different societal roles played by the two insti­
tutions. 128 The prison system is not the preeminent institution 
charged with safeguarding the rights of citizens and society. The 
court system is. It determines the ultimate correctness and effect 
of all actions undertaken by law enforcement and prosecuting 
agencies in the name of justice. Therefore prisons cannot claim the 
traditional right of access that criminal courts can. The tradition 
does not exist as to prisons because of their different role, and the 
idea of a right to view them certainly was foreign to the Founders. 
Moreover, even the right of access to criminal courts is not abso­
lute,129 and special problems of security inhere in prisons that do 
not exist to the same degree in criminal courts. 130 One further dis­
tinction is that the right of access to criminal trials is a personal 
right of every citizen. It is not the special right of press access de­
nounced by the Pell, Saxbe and Houchins triumvirate. 13l Those 
cases are inapposite to this issue. 
A second issue is the availability of transcripts as a substitute 
for personal presence in the courts. At best, transcripts provide a 
states from the beginning. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 13. Redlich thinks not, but 
claims that the fourteenth amendment makes the issue moot. Redlich, supra note 98, 
at 805-06. 
127. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text. 
128. Brief amicus curiae for New York Times Co. at 12, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
129. See notes 138-48 infra and accompanying text. 
130. See Pel! v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 
U.S. at 848-49. 
131. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 834. 
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cold record of the proceedings, which are no longer news, but his­
tory.l32 Because of the nature of the news media, reportage that is 
chronologically remote from the occurrence is not given the play it 
would normally deserve. Its value as news is diminished, and 
therefore much of it may never see print. Whatever does eventu­
ally become available may come at a time when publication is less 
desirable to the media. Yesterday's news is devalued currency in a 
business in which timing is of the essence.133 Even if the whole 
transcript is published, it is a sterile substitute for observing the 
actual conduct of a hearing; as reviewing courts are well aware. 
The demeanor, voice, and gestures of the participants are as in­
formative to the press and public as they are to the juries which 
use these elements at trial to decide facts. l34 
Reliance on transcripts is, therefore, an inadequate substitute 
for a personal right of access. First, it means that information about 
the proceeding may never get to the citizen, who relies on the 
press to gather his information. l35 The press deals in current 
events, and may be unable, due to the press of current news, to 
devote adequate attention and space to the distillation and presen­
tation of a stale transcript. Secondly, a transcript cannot convey the 
intangibles, such as atmosphere, speech intonations, gestures, and 
demeanor, which are important elements of comprehensive report­
age of criminal trials. 
Finally, before addressing the extent of the right of access,· it 
should be noted that there has been judiciaP36 or legislativel37 rec­
ognition of the public right to attend criminal trials in several 
states. The reasoning used by the courts to support the right traces 
much of what has been said in this comment. l3S 
132. Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal 
Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REV. 442,454 (1978). 
133. Id. at 464. 
134. State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 471, 
351 N.E.2d 127, 136 (1976) (Stern, J., concurring). 
135. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. 
136. E.g., State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 
35l N.E.2d 127 (1976); Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968). 
137. E.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.1420 (1968); N.Y. JUDIClARY LAW § 4 
(McKinney 1968). 
138. See Detroit Free Press V. Macomb, 4 MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2180 (Mich. 
1979) (discussing MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.1420 (1968)); New York v. Green, 4 
MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 1561 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (discussing N.Y. JUDIClARY LAW § 4 
(McKinney 1968)). See also note 136 supra and accompanying text. 
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V. PARAMETERS OF THE RIGHT 
A. 	 Accommodation of Competing Rights 
No one asserts that the right to be present at criminal trials is 
absolute, but there is agreement that it is due much more than lip 
service. Blackstone classified it among those rights and liberties 
which should be restrained only when and to the extent absolutely 
necessary to accommodate other rights. 139 This concept of accom­
modation of rights has carried through to American jurisprudence. 
When first and sixth amendment rights conflict, the trial court is 
required to resolve the conflict by protecting both rights when that 
can reasonably be done. 14o Because the right of access implicates a 
fundamental personal liberty, a compelling subordinating interest is 
required before the right may be overridden. 141 Courts have prop­
erly found such an interest, and have closed courts to some extent, 
in cases where the closure aids the court in the production of evi­
dence necessary to the function of justice. 142 The press performs a 
fiduciary duty to the courts and to the defendants when it 
cooperates with this type of closure. 143 
But the Court has held that justice does not require jurors to 
be kept in total ignorance of the circumstances of a case, save those 
which surface in court. Neither does it require that they refrain 
from forming opinions based on arguably prejudicial extrajudicial 
information. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression 
139. [It is a right which] it is our birth-right to enjoy entire; unless where 
the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints. Restraints 
in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear upon further inquiry, 
that no man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened. For all of 
us ... are restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to 
ourselves or our fellow-citizens. 
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144. 
140. State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 464, 
351 N.E.2d 127, 132 (1976). 
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur­
ring). 
142. E.g., in cases involving young witnesses or victims of crime, rape victims, 
undercover police officers and similar cases where witnesses might be unwilling to 
present their testimony in public for judicially cognizable reasons, or are likely to be 
able to testify more freely with the public excluded. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979) & United States v. Powers, 477 F. Supp. 
497 (S.D. Iowa 1979), two cases in which it was asserted that witnesses or their fami­
lies would be in physical danger if the public were admitted to hear their direct tes­
timony. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), where 
the court closed the proceeding during discussion of secret airline hijacker profile. 
143. 	 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 560. 
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or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented 
in court. 144 
The Court has recognized that even pervasive adverse public­
ity does not inevitably result in an unfair trial. The ability of a jury 
to decide a case fairly is shaded by the tone and extent of the pub­
licity, which is often, in large part, shaped by what attorneys, po­
lice, and other officials do to precipitate news coverage. 145 This, in 
turn, is within the power of the judge to control. 146 
In fact, courts and commentators have pointed out that it is 
the unusual criminal prosecution which generates publicity which 
could do harm to a defendant's rights.147 Closure itself may, in 
144. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The defendant, convicted of mur­
der, sought habeas corpus on the grounds that publicity giving the sordid details of 
his past life, previous convictions and alleged confessions and plea bargaining prior 
to voir dire had biased the jury. The Court held that even a juror with a formed opin­
ion of the defendant's guilt may be impartial, if able to lay the opinion aside and 
render a verdict on the evidence. The facts here, however, indicated a pattern of 
deep and bitter prejudice in the community that precluded impartiality. Habeas Cor­
pus was directed. Id. at 728-29. 
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, 
an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the 
vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not 
have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is 
particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any 
preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without 
more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's imparti­
ality would be to establish an impossible standard. 
Id. at 722-23. 
145. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 554-55. 
146. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text. 
147. See, e.g., People v. Biggs,S MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 1518 (N.Y. Suffolk 
County Ct., Aug. 15, 1979) (motion to close pre-trial hearing denied on grounds that 
the case had received little or no coverage). 
Most judicial proceedings in criminal cases attract no attention or such little 
attention as to be inSignificant. Even in the case which seems more "news­
worthy," the court still must speculate as to the form of the publicity, its 
context, its intensity, its frequency, its longevity, and in short, all of those 
things which go to make up its impact. 
Fenner & Koley, supra note 131, at 516-17. 
Judge Skelly Wright, of the D.C. Court of Appeals, has stated in discussing 
the issues of free press and fair trial that there is no problem at all in the 
great majority of the hundreds of thousands of criminal cases which are 
brought each year in this country because less than one percent of the cases 
are ever given a line of notice i.n tI:Ie press and of that one percent seventy­
five to ninety percent plead guilty. So, as-Judge Wright has pointed out, 
what is involved is a small fraction of the less than Olle percent of the crimi­
nal cases brought. 
A. Cox, M. HOWE, & J.R. WIGGINS, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
COURTS, 56, 70-71 (1967) (quoted in Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 517 n.329). 
See also notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text. 
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some cases, have a detrimental effect on fair trial rights that out­
weighs the potential harm of publicity. 148 All of this argues for ac­
commodation of competing rights. An order which implicates first 
amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that 
will accomplish both the precise objective permitted by the Consti­
tution and the essential needs of public order. 149 In other words, 
accommodation of fair trial rights should be accomplished with as 
little prejudice as possible to the right of the public to observe its 
criminal court trials. 
B. Closing the Trial 
In the wake of the closure phenomenon spawned by Nebraska 
Press, various courts, government bodies and organizations pro­
posed standards for closing criminal proceedings. A senate subcom­
mittee suggested that courts should be closed only when necessary 
to protect the rights of the accused, upon a showing that no 
alternative protective measures are likely to work. The proceeding 
may then be closed only to the extent absolutely necessary to pro­
tect the endangered rights. 150 
The American Bar Association proposed standards151 that allow 
the exclusion of the public from that portion of a trial before an 
unsequestered jury which takes place out of the hearing of the 
jury. The standards require several conditions to be present before 
even this limited closure is allowed: a clear and present danger to 
the fairness of the trial posed by dissemination of the information 
to be discussed; a lack of alternative means of avoiding the prejudi­
148. Closing a hearing would not restrict the press, in its various compo­
nent parts, from, for example, gathering news in other ways and then pub­
lishing that news, publishing whatever information by chance or by design 
leaks out, however accurate or garbled the leaked information may be, or 
even indulging in speculation or publicizing gossip or rumors-gossip 
spawned in part perhaps by the secrecy surrounding the closed proceeding, 
rumors which "could well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news 
accounts." 
Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 521 (quoting, in part, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. at 567). 
149. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) 
(ex parte order restraining "white supremacist" rally set aside as not comporting with 
procedural minima required in cases which reach first amendment rights); See notes 
150-56 infra. 
150. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2n SESS., FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL (Comm. Print 1976). 
151. ABA, Standards Relating To The Administration of Criminal Justice-Fair 
Trial and Free Press, § 8-3.6, at 22-27 (Approved Draft, 1978). 
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cial effect; and the defendant's consent. A transcript of the closed 
part of the trial should be made available to the public following 
the completion of the trial, or earlier if fairness permits. This is the 
only context in which the American Bar Association standards 
would allow closure. 152 
A third formula is that of the Gannett dissent, which closely 
mirrors the Nebraska Press standards for gag orders. It would re­
quire a finding that there is a substantial probability that irrepara­
ble damage to the fair trial right will result from publicity, 
alternatives to closure would not protect the fair trial right, and 
that closl.lre will protect the defendant from the perceived harm. 153 
One proposed standard that would on its face appear to be in­
capable of cutting constitutional mustard is that of the Gannett ma­
jority.154 It contemplates a "balancing" of the constitutional rights 
involved which would result in closure upon a showing of a "rea­
sonable probability of prejudice." This is an exceedingly vague and 
ill-formed approach to the resolution of a conflict between funda­
mental rights. The opinion does not discuss alternatives that could 
solve the conflicts without impinging on the rights of the public. 
Furthermore, its standard of "reasonable probability" does not ap­
proach the strict necessity,155 the clear and present danger to an­
other fundamental right, that should be required before such a 
right must yield. 
Of these various approaches, the American Bar Association 
version approaches the ideal. Most importantly, it incorporates the 
clear and present danger test, which is the appropriate yardstick in 
a case of conflict between fundamental rights. 15s Secondly, it prop­
erly narrows the availability of closure to trials with an un­
sequestered jury, and the scope of closure to proceedings held out 
of the hearing of that jury. Finally, it requires the consideration of 
alternatives to closure. It is the best available accommodation be­
152. The commentary that accompanies the standards notes that: 
Closure orders, like prior restraints on the press, have strong appeal as fair 
trial procedures because of their minimal cost, directness, and relative effi­
ciency in tenns of the use of the court's time. These administrative advan­
tages, however, must be set aside in the face of the strong constitutional pol­
icy in favor of public trials. 
Id. at 26. 
153. 443 U.S. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
154. 443 U.S. at 392-93. 
155. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur­
ring). 
156. EMERSON, supra note 68, at 73. 
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tween the rights of citizens to attend criminal trials and the rights 
of defendants to have a fair trial. It restricts closure to the minimal 
intrusion on the right of access which will support a fair trial in the 
presence of prejudicial publicity. 
C. Procedural Issues 
The initial procedural issue raised by a closure motion is the 
question of who should make the decision. One view is that the 
trial judge is not qualified to decide because he is an interested 
party. In the face of allegedly pervasive prejudicial publicity, a clo­
sure order is an easy OUt. 157 It eliminates the need to define the 
limits of the closure with neither over- nor under-inclusiveness. 
It allows the trial to proceed quickly. It obviates the need for 
continuing monitoring of the possible effects of publicity on the 
trial. The judge will be inclined to decide that in his court nothing 
will occur which needs public exposure. Lack of judicial detach­
ment is inherent in this situation. 158 The obvious way out of this 
dilemma is to provide that closure decisions are to be made at the 
next level up the appellate ladder. Closure decisions should be 
among the appellate courts' highest priorities. 
Secondly, courts should not routinely grant uncontested clo­
sure motions. The fact that a motion is uncontested probably indi­
cates that the level of prejudicial publicity will not reach the point 
where the right of access should be overridden. 159 The right to be 
present deserves protection, even when it is not being asserted, 
because of its significant constitutional dimension. 16o 
The court must also provide the media with notice and an op­
portunity to participate in an adversary hearing. 161 Realistically, 
this is the only way to assure that the court will hear both sides of 
the access issue. The prosecution is unlikely to be as interested in 
promoting the public right of access as the press would be. The 
157. "Judges are men, not angels. While some would exercise the power of 
censorship with high regard for the true interests of the judicial process, others 
might exercise it to prevent proper criticism of their own administration of office." 
Rifkind, When the Press Collides with Justice in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW 651, 653 (Ass'n of American Law Schools ed. 1963) (quoted by Fenner 
& Koley, supra note 132, at 481). 
158. Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 465. 
159. See notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text. 
160. See People v. Biggs, 5 MED. L. RPTR. (BNA)' 1518 (Suffolk County Ct., 
N.Y. Aug. 15, 1979); Note, Trial Secrecy And The First Amendment Right Of Public 
Access To Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1910 (1978). 
161. Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 451, 455. 
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judge is likely to be antagonistic to it, at least on a subliminal 
level, because closure decreases the burden of monitoring fairness 
and elevates the risk of reversal attendant to open trials held in an 
atmosphere of heavy publicity. 
Finally, there must be a mechanism for an accelerated appeal 
of a closure ruling. The right of access would be meaningless if 
courts were allowed to hold closed trials while appeal of the clo­
sure order was in process. If a restraint on access is sought which 
arguably works a deprivation of first amendment rights, it must be 
accompanied by immediate appellate review, and a stay must be 
granted in the interim. 162 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To the extent that Gannett has been used to justify criminal 
trial closure, it has been misconstrued. The case cannot extend be­
yond its facts because every citizen has a constitutional right under 
the first and ninth amendments to attend criminal trials. This right 
exists independently of the right of ~he defendant to a fair trial. It 
is an element of the right of the citizen to inspect the functioning 
of government institutions, a right with its origins in English com­
mon law. It is a right protected by the ninth amendment, both be­
cause it was considered an inherent natural right by the Founders 
and because it is a natural and necessary concomitant of the open 
society that the Constitution reflects. It also merits ninth amend­
ment protection by virtue of being necessary to the fulfillment of 
the first amendment. It is a "detail" that was left out of a document 
that was not intended to be all-inclusive. 
The first amendment's purpose is to allow citizens to 
meaningfully exercise their ultimate power of government. It al­
lows them to evaluate government so they may act on that evalua­
tion. By subjecting the courts to constant scrutiny, citizens are as­
sured of the courts' just operation. The right to be so assured is an 
interest which inheres in every citizen. 
But the right of access is not absolute. Courts need latitude to 
162. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (state supreme 
court denial of stay pending appeal of injunction against parade by American Nazis 
reversed). In a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court said that court 
orders which work a deprivation of asserted first amendment rights during the pen­
dency of appeal require immediate appellate review. The opinion's context indicates 
that an "immediate" review is one which takes place before the petitioner's in­
tended exercise of his asserted right. "Absent such review, the State must instead al­
Iowa stay." Id. at 44. 
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perform their duties efficiently in some cases. In others, the ability 
of a defendant to secure a fair trial may truly be prejudiced by 
publicity. The right of access, however, is due all the protection 
which can be afforded it, consistent with the protection of the de­
fendant's rights. The gravest necessity should be shown before the 
right to attend may be overridden, and closure should not be re­
sorted to unless it is the sole available method which will protect 
sixth amendment interests. The closure decision belongs in a disin­
terested court. Every procedural safeguard should be used to pro­
tect the integrity of the right of access, which lies at the root of the 
first amendment. 
Charles W. Danis, Jr. 
